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II 
I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on February 21, 2012. R. VoL I, p. 011-
State lJniversity, (BSU) filed its answer on April 17, 2012. R. VoL 1, p. 015-20. BSU 
asserted various affirmative defenses, including the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice 
claim requirements in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. OTCA) [d. On July 1 2012, the District 
Court issued its Order Governing Proceedings and Setting the Case for Trial. R. VoL I, p.021-
24. The Order established various deadlines governing the disclosure of expert witnesses and the 
completion of discovery. [d. Plaintiff filed his expert disclosures on April 8, 2013. R. VoL I, p. 
032-37. BSU then filed a Motion to Compel challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' expert 
disclosures and answers to written discovery. R. Vol. I, p. 039-136. On May 9, 2013, the 
District Court conducted a hearing relating to BSU's Motion to CompeL Tr. Vol. I, p. 5-31. 
On June 4, 2013, BSU filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 154-156; 
437-455. On July 1, 2013, the plaintiff filed his opposition. R. Vol. I, p. 456-477. The 
opposition was supported by various affidavits. R. Vol. I, p. 478 554. On July 15,2013, BSU 
filed a Motion to Strike challenging, on evidentiary grounds, the affidavits of Daniel Brzusek, 
Randall Epperson, Helen Zylstra, Dale Dolifka, Stephanie Zylstra, and Jeffrey Dolifka. R. VoL 
I, p. 562 563. 
On August 8, 2013, the Court heard oral arguments relating to BSU's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and, the Motion to Strike. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32-117. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Court issued its ruling granting, in part, BSU's Motion to Strike. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 56, L. 
8; p.80, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p. 730-731. At the same hearing, the Court issued its ruling granting the 
BSU's Motion for Summary Judgment. Tr. VoL I, p. 108, L.22; p. 115, L. L6. R. Vol. I, p. 733-
734. The Court denied the portion of BSU's motion which sought summary judgment on the 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF RE: CROSS-APPEAL - 1 
that Zylstra had failed to file a timely Notice of Tort Claim. Vol. I, p. 99, L.22; p. t04, 
21. Vol. I, p. 733-734. Zylstra's Motion for Reconsideration was heard and denied on 
October to, 2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 144, L.7; p. 166, L.l7. 
Final judgment was entered August 15, 2013. R. Vol I, p. 736. Zylstra filed his Notice 
Appeal on September 13,2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 748 -753. BSU filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal 
on September 17,2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 754-757. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Sam Zylstra, enrolled as a student at Boise State University (BSU) in 
2007. R. Vol. I, p. 189,269 (111:13-22, Ex. 2). Prior to attending BSU, Zylstra attended and 
was a member of the wrestling team of North Western College in Orange City, Iowa. R. Vol. I, 
P 182 (83: 11 - 18; 84: 4-14). When Zylstra became a BSU student, he tried out for the 
wrestling team. R. Vol. I, p. 184-185 (93:3; 94:20). He was never offered or received an athletic 
scholarship. R. Vol. I, p. 185 (94:1; 95:3). When he joined the team, Zylstra signed liability 
waivers releasing BSU from any claims for damages or injuries sustained while participating in 
athletics. R. Vol. I, p. 189-191 (112:21; 118: 1), R. Vol. I, p. 271-273 (Exs. 4-6). He signed the 
same liability waiver each year he was a member of the team. ld. 
In his senior year, Zylstra and the BSU team participated in the PAC-tO Championships 
in Davis, California. The tournament took place on February 26 through 27, 20 to. His first 
match was against a wrestler from Oregon State University. R. Vol. I, p. 205-206 (L 76:20-24; 
178:3-20); Aug. R; 12/18/13; (Randall Affidavit, 9[9[3-5); (White Affidavit, 9[9[3-5); (Owens 
Affidavit,9[9[3-5.) During the match, Zylstra was thrown to the mat and struck his head. ld. He 
motioned a referee asking for a timeout. See Aug. R; 12118113; (Affidavits of Kirk White, 14; 
Chris Owens, 9(4). At the same time, Coach White also called timeout. ld. According to White, 
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called the timeout because Zylstra had struck his head and, while not unconscious, had 
sroDoe:Q wrestling. Id. 1 the injury time out, was examined by team trainer 
Chom. Mr. Chom conducted neurological testing to assess whether Zylstra was injured, 
could continue. R. Vol. I, p. 342. Zylstra stated his head hurt. R. Vol. I, P 342 (27:12-17). 
testing checked for eye motility, double vision, ringing in the ears, and sensitivity to light. 
The testing was negative. Zylstra's dizziness cleared while he and Mr. Chom were on the mat. 
Vol. L p. 341-343 (24:5; 25:4; 27:5-8; 31:12-18). Chom asked Zylstra how he felt. Zylstra 
responded by indicating he was fine and wanted to continue. Id., p. 342 (28:3-19). Because 
Zylstra's symptoms cleared almost immediately, Mr. Chom made the decision that he could 
continue. [d., (p. 29, L. 5-8). At the conclusion of the OSU match, Mr. Chom took Zylstra into 
a stairway area where he repeated the neurological testing he had administered during the injury 
time out. This included the Romberg test, checking for double vision, sensitivity to light, ringing 
in the ears, retrograde memory, and nausea. R. Vol. I, p. 341 (p. 24, L. 5; p. 26, L.i2). The 
testing was, again, negative. [d. 
Prior to Zylstra's second match, Chom again assessed him, and again administered a 
series of neurological tests. R. Vol. I, p. 351 (63: 18-64:6). Zylstra tested negative, but stated he 
had a headache. [d. Zylstra won the match by pinning his opponent in less than one minute. 
Aug. R; 12118113; (White Aff., 16); R. Vol. 1, p. 398 (p. 65, L. 23; p. 66, L. 11). 
At the beginning of the second day of the tournament, Mr. Chom again assessed Zylstra 
and asked him if his condition had changed. R. Vol. I, p. 351 (p. 62, L. 1 Chorn also 
spoke with Zylstra's roommate asking if he had observed any abnormal behavior. R. Vol. I, p. 
1 During the time out, the OSU coaches protested that White called the time out in order to get 
Zylstra out of a position where he was in danger of being pinned. According to White, during 
the time out he was arguing with the OSU coaches. Aug. R; 12/18/13; (Affidavit of Kirk White, 
15). 
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1 (62:25-63:4). On the second day, Zylstra wrestled in two matches. According to Coach 
White, the match was Zylstra's best performance of the entire year. Aug. R; 12118113; 
17). Zylstra won the second match finishing fifth the tournament and qualifying 
the NCAA Tournament. Aug. R; 12118113; (White AfT., 18); Aug. R; 12118113; (Randall Aff. 
1(6). 
That evening, Zylstra, his parents, and the rest of the team dined together at a restaurant 
near the hotel. R. Vol. I, p. 402 (p. 79, 15; p. 82, L. 10); R. Vol. I, p. 343-44 (p. 33, 18-25; 
p. 35, L. 1-3). During dinner, Zylstra ate pizza and interacted with his teammates, coaches, and 
parents. R. Vol. I, p. 398, 400, 402 (p. 63, L. 1 p. 72, L. 2-5; p. 79, L. 24, p. 80, L. 14); 
Aug. R; 12118/13; (Owens Aff., 1[17-8). According to his mother, Helen Zylstra, Zylstra ate 
normally and socialized with other wrestlers. R. Vol. I, p. 402 (p. 79, L. 18; p. 80, L. 14). Mr. 
Chorn and the coaches recaB him behaving normally. R. Vol. I, p. 349 (57: 16-23). According to 
Helen Zylstra, she, her husband, and Zylstra left the restaurant together and walked to the hotel. 
R. Vol. I, p. 403 (82:11-16). When they left their son's room, he was resting and watching 
television. R. Vol. I, p. 403 (83:4-84:2). 
The next morning, the team gathered in the parking lot outside the hotel. They traveled 
together in vans to the airport. Coach Owens recalls Zylstra engaging in horse-play with other 
teammates, chasing individuals around the parking lot prior to leaving for the airport. Aug. R: 
12118113; (Owens Aff., 1(8). 
After Zylstra returned to Boise, he was seen by team physician, Scott Scheffel, M.D., on 
March 20, 2010. During the appointment, Zylstra was able to describe how he was injured and 
the symptoms he had experienced since the February 26, 2010 wrestling match when he was 
injured. R. Vol. I, p. 210, 278 (195: 10-22), R. Vol. I, p. 278, (Ex. 10); R. Vol. I, p. 348 (53:2-9). 
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time of the appointment, the doctor had already ordered and obtained an MRI of Zylstra's 
MRI was VoL I, p. (Exbs. 10-11). VoL I, p. 1 
Hoesch Aff., 9{2). Based upon the symptoms Zylstra was describing at the time, Dr. 
Scheffel advised him that he would not be medically cleared to compete in the NCAA 
Championships. R. VoL 1, p. 278 (Ex. 10). 
Immediately thereafter, Zylstra met with Coach RandalL advised his coach that 
because he had been diagnosed with a concussion, he would not be able to compete in the NCAA 
Championships. During this meeting, Zylstra was able to discuss the fact he had been diagnosed, 
that his symptoms had worsened, and that his injury was adversely affecting his performance in 
classes. Aug. R; 12118113; (Randall Aff., (H8). Coach Randall notified the NCAA and withdrew 
Zylstra from the tournament. He encouraged Zylstra to follow the instructions of his physicians. 
ld. (Randall Aft'., 9{8). 
When Zylstra first returned to Boise from the PAC-lO Championships, he continued 
driving a car and attending classes. R. VoL I, p. 209 (191: 11-24); R. Vol. r, p. 209 (44: L5-45:2). 
He also began dating a woman he had met prior to the tournament. R. Vol. I, p. 302 (18: 16-23). 
This individual is now his wife, Stephanie Zylstra. After returning to Boise from the PAC-lO 
Championships, Zylstra contacted Stephanie. This occurred the first week of March. R. Vol. I, 
p. 302 (19: 11-24). The first evening they were together, they conversed for a number of hours 
describing their respective backgrounds, and personal interests. R. Vol. I, p. 303-304 (24:2-
26: 17). After that first evening, Stephanie and Zylstra began dating. They saw each other a 
couple of times each week. R. Vol. I, p. 306 (36:21-37:7). They were married in mid-May of 
2010. R. Vol. I, p. 307 (40:5-7). 
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During the PAC-lO Championships, Zylstra was approached by a representative of W mid 
Wrestling Entertainment (WWE). Vol. I, 208 (187:9-16). When he returned to Boise, 
remained in contact with the WWE and, was asked to travel to Florida for tryouts. R. 
Vol. I, p. 217-218 (225:19-226:13). In late May he traveled alone to Florida. R. Vol. 1, p. 217 
(223 Ll). He met other wrestlers at the airport, rented a car, and traveled to a hotel provided 
by the WWE. R. Vol. I, p. 217 (223:20-225: 1). He was in Florida for approximately one week. 
[d. While he was at the gym, he advised the WWE representatives that he had sustained a 
concussion at the PAC-l 0 Championships. R. Vol. I, p. 219 (231: 13-232:7). 
After the 2010 wrestling season ended, Zylstra attended the annual camping trip 
sponsored by the wrestling team. R. Vol. I, p. 200-201 (157:11-158:11); R. Vol. I, p. 318 
(84:23-85:5). Zylstra and Stephanie traveled to the campsite with Coach Kirk White. The men 
cut firewood and erected tents. R. Vol. I, p. 318 (Stephanie Zylstra Depo, p. 85: 13-19); Aug. R; 
12/18/13; (White Aff., '1(11). The process of cutting wood and constructing seats around the fire 
pit involved considerable physical work. Zylstra was able to handle a chain saw and an axe. [d. 
(White Aff., 9[11). 
After the team camping trip, Zylstra accompanied Kirk White on at least one additional 
wood cutting trip. R. Vol. 1, p. 202 (162:3-24); Aug. R; 12/18113; (White Aff., 9[12). The two 
men cut a couple cords of wood, loaded the wood on a trailer, and transported it back to Boise. 
[d. During the trip, Zylstra and White engaged in conversations concerning the events in their 
respective lives. According to Mr. White, Zylstra acted normally and was able to converse 
intelligently. [d. (White Aff., 9[ 12). 
In March or early April of 2010, Zylstra told Stephanie that he had suffered a head injury. 
She recalls he told her he was getting an MRI and was experiencing bad headaches. R. Vol. I, p. 
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305-306 (33: 11 10). According to Stephanie, Zylstra told her the doctor had diagnosed a 
and had prescribed Ambien. R. Vol. I, p. 306 16-35:3). He also told her that 
because of the injuries he had suffered when he was slammed to the mat during a wrestling 
match, Dr. Scheffel would not give him clearance to participate in the NCAA Tournament. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 310-311 (52: 10-54: 14). 
During the same timeframe, but before marrying Stephanie, Zylstra was able to describe 
his injuries and how he was injured to his roommate, Jeff Dolifka. R. Vol. I, p. 220 (234:20-
17). In early May, he spoke with Dolifka's father, an attorney from Alaska. R. Vol. I, p. 
217 (224:19-225:22); Aug. R. 12/l8/13 (Artiach Aff., Ex. 1, pg. 3). According to the attorney, 
Dale Dolifka, Zylstra told him that he did not believe he could sue the university because he had 
signed a liability waiver which all athletes were required to sign prior to competing as a member 
of the team. R. Vol. I, p. 506 (Dolifka Aff., 1[4); R. Vol. I, p. 271-273 (Zylstra depo exbs. 4-6). 
Mr. Dolifka advised him the waiver may not be enforceable. He encouraged Zylstra to contact 
attorneys in Seattle as he believed it would be difficult to find an attorney in Boise who would be 
willing to pursue a claim against the State of Idaho and BSU. R. Vol. I, p. 506 (Dolifka Aff., 
1(4). Zylstra filed a notice of claim with the Secretary of State's office on October 22, 2010, 238 
days after his February 26,2010 injury. Aug. R; 12/l8/J3; (Artiach Aff.). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL 
I. What is the legal standard for determining whether an individual is "insane" as 
that term is used in the general tolling statute, I.C. § 5-230? 
2. Whether the district court erred when it ruled an issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether Sam Zylstra was "insane", which then tolled the filing requirements of the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
faced with an appeal from a summary judgment, the Court employs the standard of 
properly applied by the District Court when originally ruling on the motion. See Farm 
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stephenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). On review, as when the 
summary judgment motion is initially considered, the Court liberally construes the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. ld. If a party moves for summary judgment on the basis that 
no genuine issue of fact exists with regard to an element of the non-moving party's case, the non-
moving party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element. See Farm 
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stephenson, l25 Idaho at 272-273. The Court has free review over 
the construction of a statute, Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 650, 67 P.3d 
1260, 1262 (2003), which includes whether a statute provides for judicial review and the 
standard of review to be applied if judicial review is available. Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
Dist. v. Alcor, 141 Idaho 388, 400, III P.3d 73, 85 (2005). When questions of law are 
presented, the Court exercises free review and is not bound by the findings of the District Court, 
but is free to draw own conclusions from the evidence presented. "Mutual of Enumclaw v. 
Bachs, 127 Idaho 851, 852,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). 
V.ARGUMENT 
The motion for summary judgment filed by BSU sought the dismissal of the lawsuit on 
two distinct legal grounds. The first argument established Zylstra had failed to file a timely 
Notice of Tort Claim as required by I.e. § 6-905. The second argument focused upon the lack of 
a causal connection between the concussion Zylstra sustained during his first match at the 2010 
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PAC-lO Championships and any injuries he claimed were caused by the decision of the BSU 
staff to allow to continue participating in the tournament. 2 
The district court granted summary judgment on the second ground, focusing upon the 
lack of admissible medical testimony to establish a causal connection between the decision to 
allow Zylstra to continue wrestling and the injuries and damages he claims in this litigation. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 108, L.22; p. 115, L. 16; R. Vol. I, p. 733. The district court denied the portion of 
BSU's motion challenging the timeliness of Zylstra's Notice of Tort Claim, concluding his 
injuries raised an issue of fact as to whether the 180 day timeline created by the ITCA was tolled. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 99, L. 22; p. 104, L. 21. The district court did not suggest, and the record would not 
support the conclusion that Zylstra was not on "inquiry notice" when he sustained his initial 
concussion or, that his claim against BSU did not accrue on that date or shortly thereafter. [d. 
Instead, the district court focused on whether Zylstra's injuries rendered him "insane" as 
contemplated by I.C § 5-230. Tr. VoL 1, p. 100, L. 21-24; p. 104, L. 11-21. 
For the reasons outlined below, the trial court erroneously concluded an issue of material 
fact existed regarding whether Zylstra was rendered "insane" by the concussion he sustained 
during his first match at the PAC-l 0 Championships. There is no dispute Zylstra was on inquiry 
notice of his claim on the day of his injury, February 26, 2010, and no later than March 10, 2010. 
There is no dispute he was aware he had been injured, how he had been injured, and that his 
injury occurred during a BSU sanctioned event. For that reason, his claim had accrued, which 
then commenced the 180 time line created by I.C § 6-905. The district court erroneously relied 
2 The Amended Complaint describes the alleged negligence of BSU as " ... allowing plaintiff to 
continue wrestling following the suspension of action in his first match and further breached that 
duty by instructing and/or allowing him to wrestle throughout the remainder of the 
championships on February 26 and February 27." R. Vol. I, p. 13 (Amended Complaint, <[25). 
The Amended Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries caused by BSU's alleged 
negligence. 
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upon case authority addressing when a claim will accrue rather than determining whether Zylstra 
was rendered "insane" his injuries. If he did not meet the criteria for insanity under I.e. § 5-
230, the Notice of Tort Claim he filed on October 22,2010 was untimely. 
A. Zylstra was on inquiry notice of his claims against BSU prior to April 26, 2010. 
It is undisputed that Zylstra suffered his concussion on February 26, 2010. He did not 
file a Notice of Claim with the Secretary of State's office until October 22, 2010. Aug. R; 
12/18/13; (Artiach Aff.). If his claim against BSU accrued on the day of his initial injury, or on 
March 10, 2010 the day Dr. Scheffel advised him he had suffered a concussion, his notice of 
claim is untimely. 
As a prerequisite to bringing a civil action against the State of Idaho, its agencies, or 
employees, the ITCA requires potential plaintiffs to file a Notice of Claim with the Secretary of 
State "within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later." See I.e. § 6-905. Compliance with the notice requirements is a mandatory 
condition precedent and failure to comply is fatal to any claim, regardless of its legitimacy. See 
Overman v. Kline, 103 Idaho 795, 797, 654 P.2d 888, 890 (1982). 
The 180 day timeline "begins to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act, even if the 
full extent of the damages is not known at the time." See BRA Investment, Inc. v. City of Boise, 
141 Idaho 168, 174, 108 P.3d 315, 312 (2004). A claimant need not know the specific wrongful 
act. "[KJnowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the 
equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of the" 180 day time 
period. Mallory v. City of Ltlontpelier, J 26 Idaho 446, 448, 885 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 
1994). The plaintiff need not "fully understand the mechanism of the injury and the 
government's role" for the period to begin running, rather, it begins "when he or she is aware of 
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facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the 
UH',nUll'v~~J surrounding the mCIOe11(" l1-1allory, 126 Idaho at 448. In other words, period 
to run once the plaintiff has sufficient facts to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry 
notice of a potential claim against the governmental entity. Kramer v. Central Highway Dist., 
126 Idaho 722,725, 889 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1995). "The phrase 'reasonably should have been 
discovered' refers to knowledge of the facts upon which the claim is based, not knowledge of the 
applicable legal theory upon which a claim could be based." BHA Investment, 141 Idaho at 
174. Further, the statutory period begins once the claimant has knowledge of the facts even if 
the claimant did not know a cause of action existed until after consulting a lawyer. Newland v. 
State, 95 Idaho 711,717,535 P.2d 1348, 1354 (1975). 
In 111itchell v. Bingham il1emorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997), the 
plaintiff suffered a toxic overdose at a county hospital. The hospital initially told the plaintiff her 
injury was caused by a machine malfunction. Id. at 423. Two months later, the hospital 
informed her the machine did not malfunction and that a nursing error likely caused her 
overdose. Id. The plaintiff argued her cause of action did not arise until the hospital confessed 
mistake. This Court disagreed, concluding the plaintiff's knowledge of the overdose and her 
respiratory arrest on the day of the overdose "were suffIcient to cause a reasonably prudent 
person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the incident." Id. The plaintiff's 
cause of action accrued on the day of the overdose, even though she "did not know the extent of 
injury and [her] damages or the extent to which the hospital was responsible." Id. 
The district court did not conclude that Zylstra was not on inquiry notice during the 
timeframe from February 26, 2010 until April 26, 2010. Tr. Vol. I, p. 100: t3-24. The 
undisputed facts would not support that conclusion. On the day of the accident, Zylstra was 
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aware he had been injured at a BSU sanctioned event. After his return to Boise, the team's 
physician, Dr. Scheffel, obtained an MRI of his head. R. Vol. I, p. 210, 278 (195: 10-22, Ex. 10). 
On March 10, 2010, Zylstra met with the doctor to review the MRI results. During this 
appointment, he described the symptoms he was experiencing to the doctor. R. VoL 1, p. 2] 0, 
(195: LO-22), R. Vol. 1, p. 278 (Depo Exb. 10). Zylstra does not deny that on the date of his 
meeting with Dr. Scheffel, he was advised he had suffered a concussion during the P AC-1O 
wrestling tournament, and that he would not be medically cleared to participate. Further, and 
still more than 180 days before filing his notice of claim, he described his injuries to Stephanie 
Zylstra telling her he had suffered a head injury and concussion when he was slammed to the mat 
during a wrestling match. He also told her that Dr. Scheffel would not provide him medical 
clearance to participate in the NCAA Tournament because he had sustained a concussion. R. 
Vol. I, p. 310-311 (52:10-54:14). Consistent with the holdings in Lllitchell v. Bingham 
111emorial Hospital, supra, Zylstra was aware on February 26, 2010, and certainly no later than 
his March 10, 20 LO appointment with Dr. Scheffel, that he had been injured during the wrestling 
tournament as a member of the BSU team. The 180 day timeline created by I.e. § 6-905 
commenced at that time. Unless the 180 day timeline was tolled beyond April 26, 2010, the 
Notice of Claim he filed on October 22, 2010 was untimely. If the Notice of Claim is untimely, 
all claims against BSU must be dismissed. 
B. The District Court incorrectly interpreted I.e. § 5-230. 
The question of whether the filing requirements under the ITCA can be tolled was first 
addressed in Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 
(1975), where this Court ruled that "minors and those suffering incapacities were not intended to 
be exempted from the requirements of the Act." See 97 Idaho at 62. The Court further 
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concluded that the filing requirement of the ITCA was not a statute of limitations and, for that 
reason, was not impacted by the general tolling statute found at I.e. § 5-230. See 99 Idaho at 63. 
The Court treated the plaintiff's minority as a factor which could be considered deciding 
whether a claim reasonably should have been discovered,". See 99 Idaho at 62. In other words, 
minority was to be considered in determining when the plaintiff's claim accrued. 
The applicability of the general tolling statute to the notice requirements of the ITCA was 
revisited in Doe v. Durtschi, Ito Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). The Court overruled 
portions of its prior holdings in Callister, which dealt with tolling, by writing" ... we hold that the 
general tolling provision, I.e. § 5-230 applies to all procedures integral to commencing actions 
against private or public defendants, including the notice procedure of I.e. § 6-906." See Ito 
Idaho at 479. 
As a result of the ruling in Doe v. Durtschi, the available grounds for tolling the 180 day 
timeline are limited to those outlined in the general tolling statute, I.e. § 5-230. That statute 
reads: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than recovery of real 
property, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, either 
1. Under the age of minority; or 
2. Insane. '" 
Based upon the plain language of the statute, tolling is recognized only when, at the time a 
plaintiff's cause of action accrues, the plaintiff is either a minor or was insane. The term 
"insane" is not statutorily defined. 
In this case, the district court recognized the lack of Idaho case authority addressing the 
question of when a plaintiff is considered "insane" as contemplated by I.e. § 5-230. Tr. Vol. I, 
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p. 99, L. 22; p. 100, L. 3. The court recognized the distinction between identifying when a claim 
accrues as opposed to whether a plaintiff is entitled to tolling by stating: 
When the phrase reasonably should have been is used, it refers to 
knowledge of the facts upon which the claim is based, not 
knowledge on the applicable legal theory upon which the claim 
could be based, which is why I stopped counsel. He's 
misunderstanding what it is. It is not discovery of the fact I have a 
legal theory at a claim. It's the fact that I discovered that I have 
been injured. Be that as it may be, the court is faced with the 
problem of trying to figure out what the statute means when we use 
the word insane. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 100, L. 13-24. Recognizing the lack of a statutory definition or controlling Idaho 
case authority, the Court cited an Alaska case, Adkins v. Neighbor's Alaska Drilling, Inc., 
609 P.2d 15 (1980) as instructive because it dealt with a head injury and was consistent with 
the underlying logic in Larson v. Emmett School Dist. No. 221, 99 Idaho 120,577 P.2d 1168 
(1978). Tr. Vol. I, p. 101, L. 23; p. 102, L. 11. 
When Larson v. Emmett School Dist. No. 221, was decided, this Court had not re-
examined or overruled Callister. For that reason, the holdings in Larson were not based upon 
the plaintiff's entitlement to tolling under I.e. § 5-230. Considering the plaintiff in Larson 
did not allege she suffered from mental incapacity and was not a minor, tolling could never 
have been a basis to extend the notice of claim requirements under I.e. § 5-230. Instead, the 
holding in Larson focused upon whether the plaintiff's physical injuries were an "incapacity" 
under I.e. § 6-907 which prevented her from filing a notice of a claim within the statutory 
time period. See 99 Idaho at 123. In Larson, the plaintiff's physical injuries left her unable to 
walk or leave her home until after the filing deadline had expired. See 99 Idaho at 121. 
Rather than ruling she was required to rely upon the help of others to accomplish the filing, 
this Court concluded an issue of fact existed concerning whether her physical condition was 
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an "incapacity" and, if so, whether that incapacity excused her non-compliance with the filing 
[d. at 1 
An important ruling in Larson is the Court's statement that its conclusions were based 
upon and consistent with its earlier holdings in Callister. The Court wrote: "[I]t should be 
noted that we do not depart from Callister; we hold only that the giving of notice within a 
reasonable time, not exceeding 120 days after removal of the incapacity, is a compliance with 
the statutory requirement." See 99 Idaho at 123. 
In Callister, the plaintiff was incapacitated by his minority and the physical injuries he 
sustained in the accident that was the subject of the lawsuit. See 97 Idaho at 62. 3 Despite his 
undisputed disabilities, the Court concluded the language in I.e. § 6-907 " ... makes clear that 
minors and those suffering incapacities were not intended to exempted from the requirements 
of the Act." Id. (emphasis added). The Court recognized the ITCA and § 6-907 created a 
more liberal standard for determining when a plaintiff's claim accrues stating: 
In Idaho, however, the statutory time is measured 'from the date 
the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later.' I.e. § 6-906 (emphasis supplied). The Idaho 
statute has given greater consideration to disability than has the 
Washington statute and is more liberal in that regard. Therefore, 
we are not required to apply a strained construction to our statute. 
Minority and incapacitation are but two factors which may be 
considered in deciding whether a claim reasonably should have 
been discovered. 
See 97 at 62. The case was then remanded and the trial court instructed" ... to, if necessary, take 
further proof on the question of whether or not plaintiff's claim should 'reasonably have been 
discovered' within a time frame activating the requirements of the statutory notice of claim 
requirement and thereafter enter an order denying or granting the defense motion for summary 
, The plaintiff, Scott Patterson, became a quadriplegic by the injuries he sustained in the accident. 
See 97 Idaho at 62. 
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judgment." See 97 Idaho at 63. This language establishes that "incapacity" under I.e. 6-907 
was not to be treated as a for tolling. Instead, the child's incapacity, which included 
minority and physical injuries, was relevant only to determine when he should have discovered 
his claim which also identified when his claim accrued and the statutory timeline commenced. 
The Court in Larson relied upon its earlier ruling in Callister, and concluded the notice 
requirements of the ITCA were not tolled by an individual's minority or incapacity. Instead, 
incapacity was treated as a factor to consider when determining when a claim reasonably should 
have been discovered, i.e. when the claim accrued. See Larson, 99 Idaho at 122; see also 
Callister, 97 Idaho at 62. 
In Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986), this Court again addressed the 
issue of tolling and recognized "[T]he determination of reasonable discovery and notice on the 
part of minor plaintiffs is a different matter which this court has yet to satisfactorily resolve." 
See 110 Idaho at 475. Recognizing the ambiguity that existed, the Court stated " ... we did not 
establish in Callister the extent to which minority was a factor. Nor did we have the opportunity 
to thoroughly consider the implications of Idaho's general tolling statute, I.e. § 5-230." Id. The 
Court then embraced the approach suggested by Justice Bakes in his dissent in Callister, which 
applied the general tolling statute, I.e. § 5-230, to the ITCA notice statute. See 110 Idaho at 477. 
Based upon the holdings in Doe v. Durtschi, the portions of Callister that exempted the 
ITCA notice provisions from the general tolling statute were overruled. See 110 Idaho at 479. 
Because Larson was an extension of Callister, it must be read in light of the holdings in Doe v. 
Durtschi. Thus, after Doe v. Durtschi the only basis for tolling the notice requirements of the 
ITCA are those provided by the general tolling statute, I.e. § 5-230. In this case, the district 
court's reliance upon Larson as authority to interpret the term "insane" in I.e. § 5-230 is 
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misplaced and, utilizes a legal standard which focuses upon when Zylstra could have discovered 
than addressing whether he suffered from a mental condition or disability which 
rendered him insane which then excused his non-compliance with the 180 day filing 
requirement. Unlike the facts in Larson, there is no evidence that Zylstra's injuries prevented 
him from complying with the ITCA. At all times, he knew he had been injured, how he had been 
injured, and was able to describe his symptoms to his treating physician as well as his coaches. 
R. Vol. I, p. 208 (188:22-189:14); R. VoL I, p. 209 (190:13-15, 191:14-21); Aug. R. 12118/13 
(Randall Aff., <J(8). He was never hospitalized or unable to leave his home or interact with others 
within the community. R. Vol. I, p. 278-286; R. Vol. I, p. 302 (18: 16-23); R. Vol. I, p. 307 
(40:5-7); R. Vol. I, p. 2l7-218 (225: 19-226:6; 223:20-224:9). In Larson, the plaintiffs physical 
injuries prevented her from leaving her home, meeting with her attorney, or taking the steps 
which would be necessary to comply with the notice requirements. See 99 Idaho at 121. In 
contrast, Zylstra lived independently, drove a car, attended classes at BSU, dated his current 
wife, and communicated with representatives of the WWE concerning a career in professional 
wrestling. These facts are all undisputed. The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting 
Zylstra was incapacitated within the meaning of I.e. § 6-907 or, more important, could not 
discover or was not aware of his claims against BSU. Clearly his claim accrued no later than 
March 10, 2010, the day he met with Dr. Scheffel and was told he had a concussion and would 
not be medically cleared to participate in the NCAA Tournament. Unless he was entitled to 
tolling, his Notice of Claim is untimely. 
C. Legal Standard for Tolling under I.C. § 5-230. 
The district court committed error when it determined the legal standard for tolling 
considers an individual's "incapacity" under I.e. § 6-907. The undisputed facts establish 
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Zylstra was on inquiry notice and his claim accrued no later than March 10, 2010. This left the 
issue for the district court to address to whether an issue of fact existed regarding whether 
was "insane" at the time his claim accrued. 
Tolling statutes that are based upon insanity or mental incapacity excuse individuals 
from strict compliance with the timelines contained in statutes of limitations. See McCarthy v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y. 2nd 543,548,450 N.Y.S. 2nd 457,453 N.E. 2nd 1072 (1982) 
(rejecting claim of post-traumatic neurosis manifesting as an inability to confront the memory 
of an accident as constituting "insanity" for purposes of tolling). Courts that have addressed 
the legal standard for insanity have allowed tolling" ... only to those individuals who are unable 
to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society." See 55 N.Y. 
2nd at 548. Stated another way" ... a person is incompetent for the purposes of tolling a statute 
of limitations 'when the disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage 
his [or her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities' 52 
AmJur 2nd Limitations of Actions, § 187 (1970)." See O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 
State of Utah, 821 P.2d 1139,1142 (Utah 1991). 
Although not directly on point, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Chico-Rodriguez v. 
State, 141 Idaho 579, 114 P.3d 137 (2005) addressed tolling under I.e. § 5-230 in actions 
seeking post-conviction relief. The Court recognized the standard is "high," ruling a petitioner 
must "show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered him incompetent to 
understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or otherwise render him incapable of 
taking necessary steps to pursue that right." See 141 Idaho at 140. The standard utilized in 
Chico-Rodriguez is similar to the standard courts from around the country have applied to the 
terms "insane" or, "mentally incapacitated" found in general tolling statutes. A plaintiff's 
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burden to avoid requirements is high, requiring proof that their disability prevented 
from being ~U'-JULJ.'V of managing their personal or comprehending their legal 
or responsibilities. See O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, State of Utah, 821 P.2d 1139 
od (l991); see also IUcCarthy, 55 N.Y. 2 at 548; Hernandez-Robaina v. State, 849 P.2d 783, 
785 (Alaska 1993); Walker v. Brannen, 243 Ga. App. 235, 236-237, 533 S.E. 2d 129, 130 
(2000); Feeley v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 949, 951-952, 285 
Cal. Rptr 666, 667 (1991); English v. Bousamra, 9 F.Supp 2d 803, 808 (W. D. Mich. 1988) 
(applying Michigan law). 
Courts have been resistant to claims seeking to extend statutory deadlines based upon 
the argument a plaintiff suffered from loss of memory or repressed memories. In Travis v. 
Ziter, 681 S. 2d 1348 (Ala. 1996), the Alabama Supreme Court refused to treat a plaintiff's 
repressed memory as a disability or insanity for purposes of tolling. In that case, the plaintiff 
argued a combination of his PTSD and repressed memory created an issue of fact concerning 
when he could have become aware of his potential claims. This argument was rejected with 
the court writing: 
The essence of the Travis's argument is that plaintiffs should be 
able to use the tolling provision in any situation where they can 
demonstrate an inability to comprehend a specific legal right, or to 
recall events that happened many years before, notwithstanding the 
fact that they have been capable of living an independent, normal, 
and productive life as to all other matters. Such an expansive 
interpretation would undetermined the purpose of the statutes of 
limitations. There is no established acceptance of repressed 
memory as a psychological phenomenon. If this Court accepted it 
as constituting "insanity," then plaintiffs such as the Travises, 
would be in subjective control of the limitations period and would 
be able to assert stale claims without sufficient justification or 
sufficient guarantees of accurate fact finding. 
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681 S. 2d. at 1355. A similar conclusion was reached in O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services, State of Utah, 1 P.2d 1139, 1145-1146 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that tolling on the grounds of incompetency " ... does violence to the term 
'incompetence' as it has been used up to this time." See 821 P.2d at 1143. The plaintiff was 
not considered incompetent for purposes of tolling because, since the time of his sexual abuse, 
he had been able to "care for his personal safety and provide himself with necessities such as 
food, shelter, medical care and clothing." Id. Additionally, he had attended school, lived 
independently, and worked for a helicopter company where he negotiated the recovery of 
warranty damages from suppliers for the failure of covered parts. Id. During this time, he was 
aware he had been abused. His claimed disability allegedly prevented him from revealing his 
abuse and pursuing his legal rights. This argument was rejected with the Court ruling "[u]nder 
his proposal, any person otherwise competent could avoid a statute of limitations by claiming to 
have been psychologically disabled from asserting a specifically legal claim before the statute of 
limitations ran." See 821 P.2d at 1143. 
An important aspect of these cases is the fact the court's examination of the insanity 
issue takes into consideration the plaintiff's ability to function in society as well as their 
cognitive ability to comprehend their legal rights. See Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 140; 
O'Neal, 821 P2d at 1142; Hernandez-Robaina, 849 P.2d at 785. That a plaintiff experienced 
symptoms or problems which included periods of memory loss or neurosis does not, unless the 
memory loss arose at the time their claim accrued, create an issue of fact for the jury.4 Rather 
4 Courts have ruled that periods of unconsciousness, caused by the injury that is the subject of the 
lawsuit, will toll the statute of limitations during those periods. See Feeley v. So. Pacific. 
Transportation Co., 243 Cal App 3d 949, 285 Cal Rptr. 666 (1991) (statute of limitations tolled 
during the time the plaintiff was in a coma caused by a head injury as, during that time, the 
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than asking whether a plaintiff could have discovered his claims, the proper analysis of the 
tolling issue focuses upon whether the undisputed facts establishes he or she meets lecral b 
standard for insanity under the applicable tolling statute. 
In this case, the district court acknowledged Zylstra's "memory problems in and of 
themselves by themselves would not justify a failure to comply with the Tort Claim Act." Tr. 
VoL 1, p. 140, L. 14-17. Yet, relying upon the approach taken in Adkins and in Larson, where 
the issue of when a plaintiff could have reasonably discovered their claim was deferred to the 
jury, the district court found an inference raised by the lay testimony of Stephanie Zylstra, 
Dolifka, and Helen Zylstra created an issue of fact regarding Zylstra's "insanity" following his 
initial injury. Tr. VoL I, p. 103, L. 18; p. 104, L. 2. The statements relied upon by the court 
described the witnesses' observations that Zylstra complained of headaches, had trouble in 
school, was forgetful, and had difficulty concentrating. Tr. Vol. I, p. 103, L. 18; p. 104, L. 2; p. 
140, L. 3-17, R. Vol. I, p. 494-495, 499-500, 502-503. What is lacking in these affidavits is any 
suggestion that Zylstra was incapable of managing his personal affairs or, perhaps more 
important, understanding his legal rights or responsibilities. The district court's ruling did not 
address these critical issues. For that reason, the court failed to address whether Zylstra was 
"insane" at the time of his injury. If his concussion did not render him insane on the day his 
claim accrued, Zylstra was not entitled to tolling under Le. § 5-230. 
What is undisputed is the fact that, following the PAC-IO Tournament, Zylstra lived 
independently, drove a car, attended classes at BSU and, was able to attend his doctor's 
appointments. R. Vol. I 208 (188:22-189:14); R. Vol. I, p. 209 (190:13-15; 191:14-21). He 
also courted and married his wife. R. Vol. I, p. 302 (18:16 - 23), R. Vol. I, p. 307 (40:5-7). 
plaintiff was incapable of caring 
nature or effects of his actions). 
their property, transacting business, or understanding the 
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remained in contact with the WWE concerning a career in professional wrestling, eventually 
traveling to Florida for tryouts. Vol. I, 21 18 (225: 19-226:6; 223:20-224:9). During his 
March 10, 2010 appointment with Dr. Scheffel, Zylstra was able to describe the symptoms he 
had experienced since his February 26,2010 injury. R. Vol. I, p. 278. This included headaches, 
nausea, sleeplessness, concentration, and memory deficits. Id. These undisputed facts establish 
that, as of March 10, 20 lO, the memory issues and judgment problems relied upon by the 
district court to deny summary judgment had not impacted his ability to understand he had been 
injured while wrestling for BSU at the PAC-lO Tournament. His concussion did not impact his 
ability to describe the symptoms he was experiencing to his doctor. R. Vol. 1, p. 278. After he 
was told by Dr. Scheffel that he would not be medically cleared, Zylstra immediately advised 
Coach Randall that, due to his concussion, he could not participate in the NCAA Tournament. 
Aug. R; 12118/13; (Randall Aff, <j(8). Zylstra told Coach Randall his headaches and other 
symptoms he was experiencing were caused by the concussion he sustained at the P AC-I 0 
Tournament. Id. 
Thereafter, in March or early April of 20 I 0, Zylstra told Stephanie he had suffered a 
head injury at a wrestling tournament when his head was slammed to the mat. R. Vol. I, p. 3lO-
311 (p. 52: lO-54: 14). At the same time, he told Stephanie he had seen Dr. Scheffel, had been 
diagnosed with a concussion and prescribed Ambien. R. Vol. I, p. 306, (p. 34: 16-35:3). He 
also told her the doctor would not give him medical clearance to participate in the NCAA 
Tournament. [d. 
These facts establish Zylstra's memory of events which would place him on inquiry 
notice for purposes of the ITCA, were not lost or repressed on March 10, 2010, his initial 
appointment with Dr. Scheffel, or in early April, when he described his condition and how he 
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was injured to Stephanie. 
discovering his claims. 
same facts establish his injuries did not prevent him from 
During this same time, Zylstra was able to describe injuries and how he was injured 
to his roommate Jeff Dolifka. R. Vol. 1, p. 220 (234:20 - 235: 17). Dolifka encouraged Zylstra 
to speak to his father, Dale Dolifka. R. Vol. I, p. 503 (Dolifka Aff., <j(5). Additionally, during 
this time period, Zylstra remained in contact with representatives of the WWE and was 
considering a professional wrestling career. R. Vol. I, p. 217 (225: 19-226:8). In fact, in May he 
traveled to Florida for try-outs. R. Vol. I, p. 217, 219 (223:4-11; 233:4-8). While he was in 
Florida, he told WWE people he had suffered a concussion at the PAC-lO Tournament. R. Vol. 
I, p. 219 (231:13-232:11). 
In early May, he met with Dale Dolifka, an attorney from Alaska. Aug. R; 12118113; 
(Artiach Aff. Ex. 1, p. 3). Zylstra told Mr. Dolifka that he did not believe he could pursue a 
lawsuit against BSU because he had signed a liability waiver. R. Vol. I, p. 506, (Dolifka Aff., 
<J(4). This shows Zylstra first considered litigation against BSU sometime before early May and 
then sought legal advice when he spoke with Mr. Dolifka. 
These facts all establish that Mr. Zylstra was not rendered "insane" by the concussion he 
sustained at the PAC-l 0 Tournament. While he was experiencing symptoms, Zylstra was never 
unable to attend to his personal affairs, make plans for his future, or take action to protect his 
legal rights. 
Any memory problems Zylstra experienced between the time of his injury and early 
May of 2010 did not involve the facts which placed him on inquiry notice of his potential claim 
against BSU. During the critical time period, he was always aware he had suffered a 
concussion at the PAC-lO tournament while wrestling for Boise State University. He was able 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF RE: CROSS-APPEAL - 23 
to describe his injuries and how he was injured to his medical providers, his girlfriend, his 
an attorney, and WWE officials. The record lacks any evidence suggesting he ever 
the ability to remember those critical facts from the time of his injury until April 26, 2010. 
More importantly, in April of 2010, he considered the possibility of pursuing litigation against 
BSU and, on his own, concluded the liability waiver he had signed may bar his claims. R. VoL 
I, p. 506 (Dolifka Aff, 114). 
These facts establish that as a matter of law, Zylstra possessed the cognitive ability to 
understand he possessed a claim and that legal defenses may exist. This is the type of cognitive 
reasoning which caused Dr. Beaver to conclude that Zylstra possessed the ability to appreciate 
the fact he had been injured, how he had been injured, and that Boise State University 
employees were, in some manner, involved in the wrestling match where he was injured. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 434-435 (Beaver Aff., ~[3). 
The district court erred by failing to address whether the undisputed facts established 
that Zylstra was "insane" because his concussion left him unable to care for his personal affairs 
or understand his legal rights in connection with the injuries he sustained at the PAC-1O 
Tournament. The facts this case do not present a disputed issue of fact concerning his insanity. 
Zylstra was not entitled to tolling under I.e. § 5-230 and, for that reason, the denial of BSU's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, the order of the district court which found an issue of 
material fact exists concerning whether Mr. Zylstra was insane and entitled to tolling under I.e. 
§ 5-230 should be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of February, 2014. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
By ~-~.~-
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF by 
delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Geoffrey D. Swindler 
Law Office of Geoffrey D. Swindler 
103 East Indiana Avenue, Suite A 
Spokane, W A 99207 
Telephone: (509) 326-7700 
Attorneys for Plaint~ff/Appellant 
James F. Whitehead 
Law Office of James Whitehead, PLLC 
2003 Western Ave., Suite 330 
Seattle, WA 98121 
Telephone: (206) 448-0100 
Attorneys for Plaint~/Counter­

















Phillip J. Collaer 
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